Biochemical oxygen demand is an important example of water pollutants that degrade biochemically and affect water quality according to the location as well as the strength of the discharge. Therefore, it is important to examine carefully the potential water quality impacts of a program of transferable discharge permits (TDPs) to regulate these discharges prior to the implementation of such a program. This paper provides a framework for evaluating these impacts and illustrates trade-offs among cost eficiency, equity, and uncertainty with respect to meeting water quality goals. Examples are given for the Delaware River estuary and the Willamette River. It is shown that violations of the standard could occur under a TDP program. Restrictions on the market could be used, however, to control or possibly to eliminate such violations. Limits on the total discharge in sections of the basin, zone boundaries for markets, and revaluation factors for transferred permits were shown to be effective individually or in various combinations. Even with these restrictions, however, there is sufficient flexibility so that significantly more cost-efficient solutions are obtained than under direct regulation programs that treat all dischargers uniformly.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, transferable discharge permit (TDP) programs have received considerable attention from researchers and policy analysts for several reasons. They may be more cost efficient than direct regulation programs because dischargers with high waste reduction costs would be allowed to purchase permits from dischargers with low costs [see, for example, Eheart, 19803. Also, the opportunity to sell unneeded permits increases incentives for innovation in waste reduction techniques. T D P programs may also be attractive from an equity viewpoint, since the financial burden on the dischargers that would result from effluent charges, the other major category of incentives-based program, can be eliminated at the option of the authority if permits are initially allocated free of charge [see Brill et a/., 1979; Eheart et al., 19831.
Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) is an important representative of the category of water pollutants that degrade once discharged. In such a case the location of a discharge affects the impact on water quality (dissolved oxygen in the BOD case) at a given location. Also because physical parameters typically vary throughout a watercourse, a change in the location of a discharge usually does not just shift the location of impact, it also affects the degree of the impact.
Because of the location-dependent effect of a given discharge on water quality, the maintenance of the applicable water quality standard must be evaluated carefully if a TDP program is being considered for implementation. Purchases and sales of permits would change discharge locations and therefore would change the water quality impacts. Unrestricted exchanges could lead to severe violations of water quality standards.
This paper describes a framework for evaluating water quality impacts of T D P systems and illustrates typical trade-offs among cost efficiency, equity. and uncertainty with respect to meeti g a given water qualit) standard. The framework and 1 trade-offs are described via examples based on case studies for the Delaware River estuary and Willamette River; they are typical of watercourses where there may be locationdependent effects of waste discharges. Water quality impacts were evaluated in both cases by using a mathematical model, such as the Streeter and Phelps model [see, for example, Thomann, 1972, chapters 5, 6, and 71. A set of design conditions was assumed in each case for physical parameters such as river flow, and various values for a dissolved oxygen standard were considered. Extreme events may, of course, be more severe than the design conditions, and during such events, a given water quality standard could be violated. Background information about the Delaware and Willamette rivers is provided by Brill et al. [1981] .
In this study it was assumed that a TDP market would function smoothly (Le., without significant strategic behavior by participants). This issue is explored separately by Lyon [1981, 19823 . It was also assumed that a regional authority exists and that it selects water quality standards, regulates waste discharges, and designs the management program.
The following section describes methods for evaluating the extreme adverse water quality impacts that could occur under two types of TDP programs if restrictions are not placed on exchanges. The third section describes several ways to mitigate adverse impacts and illustrates an analysis of trade-offs among water quality impacts, cost efficiency, and equity. It is shown that for typical conditions there is a significant amount of flexibility in designing a TDP system by using the analytical framework provided. Furthermore, there are several illustrations of restrictions on TDP markets that (1) effectively prevent significant violations of water quality standards and yet ( 2 ) provide enough flexibility so that significantly more costefficient solutions are obtained than under rigid direct regulation programs that treat all discharges uniformly. Conclusions are summarized in the fourth section. fication of a UT program if permits are initially distributed according to a UT formula so that the specified DO standard is just met and then trading is allowed. Regardless of the details of the TDP program, the same total load allowed under a UT program can be distributed among dischargers; the final distribution would be determined by the exchanges. The least cost (LC) solution is defined as the least expensive combination of waste reduction levels that meet a given DO standard. Although LC solutions are typically not practical planning solutions, because of equity problems and information requirements, they do provide a benchmark for cost comparisons. In general, I X solutions can be obtained by using mathematical programing [see, for example, Thomann, 1972, chapter 11).
In this study, BOD market solutions were obtained by using simulation, as described above. For the Delaware example, LC and UT solutions were obtained from work by Brill et al. [1976] , and for the Willamette example they were obtained from a study by Eheart [1980] .
As shown in Table 1 the BOD market solutions are less costly than the corresponding UT solutions; this result is typical because trading allows the dischargers with relatively low costs to provide a greater than average share of the waste removal. In some cases the BOD markets are nearly as cost eficient as the LC solutions.
A BOD market solution is generally not as efficient, however, as an LC solution. The LC solution is the result of an analysis of each discharger's cost curve for waste reduction and the effect of its BOD discharge on the DO level at the constraining location(s). Dischargers with very small impacts on DO at the constraining location(s) would tend to be allowed higher levels of BOD dischargers under an LC solution than under a BOD market solution. Thus the BOD market solution tends to be less eflicient than the LC solution, since it does not provide for fine tuning of discharge levels of individual dischargers based on location-dependent effects.
The simulated market solutions were also evaluated by using a water quality model to estimate the DO profile. (The UT and LC solutions were originally obtained to meet the specified DO standard.) The D O level at the lowest point in each profile is given in . Subsequently, the permits could be traded-perhaps through procedures such as quarterly auctions arranged by the regulatory authority.
The main attractive feature of such a program is that the solution obtained would tend to be cost eflicient. Relatively high levels of waste removal would tend to be provided by the dischargers with relatively low costs, and there would be a strong incentive for innovation in waste removal techniques, since excess permits can be sold.
The efficiency of such a TDP system was examined by using simulated solutions for the Delaware and Willamette rivers. TDP market solutions were simulated by using engineering estimates of waste treatment costs. Other costs, such as transaction costs or administrative costs, were not taken into account. It was assumed that waste production levels and waste reduction costs would remain constant and that existing dischargers would trade permits as long as cost savings are possible. The simulated solution for a TDP program based on BOD permits is called a BOD market solution in the following discussion. Additional details are provided by Eheart [ 19801 and Lence [ 19801. The data bases used for the Delaware and Williamette examples are described by Brill et a/. [198l] . The Delaware example has 44 dischargers, and their discharge levels vary widely from lo00 to 500.000 Ib;d of BOD. Marginal costs for the 44 dischargers vary widely from $1.1 to $820/yr per Ib/d of BOD reduction for low levels of additional waste reduction. At high levels of waste reduction the marginal costs vary from about $7 to $1500/yr per ]bid.
The Willamette example has 11 dischargers varying in size from 4100 to 125,000 lbjd of BOD discharge. Marginal costs for these dischargers vary from $0.5 to $56/yr per Ib/d of BOD reduction for low levels of additional waste reduction; the 
Worst Case Water Quality Impacts
The simulated market solutions were obtained by considering exchanges among existing dischargers only and at existing waste production levels. Over time, however, some dischargers may increase waste production, and new ones may enter the basin. There is considerable uncertainty with respect to water quality impacts, since it is not possible to predict the location pattern of all of the discharges after several rounds of exchanges have taken place over numerous years. If permits are issued with long durations (e.g., 25 years or in perpetuity), this problem could be especially serious; shorter durations (e.g., 5 years) would allow better estimates of possible location patterns but may decrease the cost etliciency of the resulting solutions, since dischargers would have to plan with uncertainty about the future availability of permits.
To examine the worst possible impact on DO that could occur for each level of total BOD load for each river, the worst possible location patterns were evalauted. In this analysis of extreme conditions, no restrictions were placed on the final locations of dischargers, and in the typical solutions all of the waste load is located at one place. (The worst case analyses were performed for assumed design conditions, such as for river flow and temperature; during periods with more severe river conditions, it is, of course, possible to have even greater water quality impacts.)
The DO standard would always be met for the LC and UT solutions under the assumed design conditions because discharge permits cannot be transferred. Also, as discussed above, the DO level achieved after the simulated trading in a BOD market would at least nearly equal the standard for the Delaware and Willamette examples. The worst possible impacts with unrestricted trading, however, could lead to substantial violations of the D O standard, as shown in Table 1 .
The Delaware and Willamette examples, however, show quite different results. In the Delaware case the worst possible set of exchanges, from a water quality point of view, would have drastic impacts. The oxygen would be completely depleted in some sections because it is possible for very large waste loads to be concentrated at the very worst location [see Brill et al., 1981, for details]. In these cases the potential loads are very much greater than required to drive the dissolved oxygen level to zero.
In the Willamette example the critical DO point occurs at the mouth of the river in all cases. The worst possible D O levels occur when all of the BOD discharge is concentrated at one point about 50-km upstream from the mouth. As shown in Table 1 the worst possible impacts are not nearly as great as in the Delaware cases. In the case of the 6 mg/l standard for D O the maximum possible violation is only 0.8 mg/l.
These examples illustrate that the worst case impacts may vary considerably from waterway to waterway because of differing physical features. In either situation the worst case impacts may be estimated by using a water quality model. Additional description of the methods of analysis and listings of the computer programs are provided by Brill et al. [1981] .
It is shown above that potential impacts may be drastic, and it is important in such cases to evaluate restrictions on a TDP market to ensure water quality protection. Various forms of restrictions are considered in the third section. It is also important, however, to recognize that the worst case condition may be very unlikely to occur. The next subsection describes a stochastic simulation approach that can be used to provide an estimate of the probability distribution of potential water quality impacts of unrestricted markets for BOD permits.
Probability Distribution of DO Impacts
The worst case scenario reported above may be highly unlikely. One technique for evaluating more thoroughly the potential water quality impacts is stochastic simulation. If the probability of each permit being located at a given point along a waterway is estimated or assumed, then a probability distribution can be estimated for the DO impacts at various water quality check points. More importantly, however, several scenarios with different assumptions about future location patterns for permits can be explored to determine the robustness of the probability distributions for DO impacts. (In general, market forces may turn out to be inconsistent with assumed probability distributions, and particular geographic patterns of waste discharge may persist because of regional economic conditions. It would be inappropriate to view the probability distributions obtained for DO impacts as applying quantitatively to future conditions. The approach may, however, provide useful insights about a particular case for planning purposes.)
To illustrate this approach, a case study was carried out using the Delaware example. As shown in Table 1 , under a 2 mg/l standard, the simulated BOD market solution would have a critical DO value of 1.9 mg/l. The worst case D O level, however, would be zero. Similar conditions occur under the other standards. A stochastic simulation was used to examine the likelihood of such severe impacts and to evaluate the likely range of D O impacts under a TDP market for BOD permits. The Delaware River has been modeled by dividing it into 30 sections. The stochastic simulation was carried out by assuming the probability that a given permit (and the corresponding discharge) would be located in any given section.
For each BOD market program the total BOD load was divided into "packets" of 500 kg/d. These packets were randomly assigned to the 30 sections on the basis of the assumed probability distributions. The DO profile was then calculated for a location pattern for the total load. This process of determing a complete set of random assignments was repeated 100 times to estimate the probability distribution for the water quality impacts in all of the river sections.
In scenario 1 it was assumed that the final location of a given permit is equally likely at any point along the estuary.
Thus the probability of locating each packet in a given section was assumed to be proportional to the length of the section.
(If p , is the probability of locating each packet in section i and L, is the length of section i, then p , = L,/Cf:, Lr.)
The results of running the stochastic simulation 100 times under this scenario are given in Table 2 . For each simulated run the minimum DO along the profile is not nearly as severe as in the worst case. Furthermore, the minimum values for the 100 runs are fairly tightly packed-between 0.7 and 1.4 mfl, 2.0 and 2.6 mg/l, and 2.9 and 3.3 mg/l for the three cases. The most important observation, however, is that all of the simulated runs produced DO profiles with a minimum point that would violate the DO standard. Under the 3 mg/l standard, for instance, a total of 201,000 kg/d of BOD could be allocated to existing dischargers under a uniform treatment program. If a BOD market is put in place, the market simulation indicates that the final location pattern would produce a minimum DO level of 3.5 mg/l. Allowing for changes throughout the basin with equal probabilities for the ultimate location of permits along the estuary, however, it is shown that a future DO profile may be likely to violate the 3 mg/l standard. Such results indicate the importance of considering market restrictions to prevent or to reduce the likelihood of violations of the standard.
The trend discussed above results partially from the assumed probabilities for the location of each packet of BOD. The assumption that the probabilities are equal for any point along the estuary-without consideration of the current locations of major cities and industries-is best interpreted as a scenario of the distant future, about which very little is known.
Such a scenario may be appropriate if permits are defined to exist in perpetuity. The BOD market simulations, on the other hand, consider only exchanges among existing dischargers at current waste production levels and produce solutions that meet the standard or violate it by no more than 0.1 mg/l. This scenario is representative of the near future and may be most appropriate if permits are defined for only a few years. Thus there may be a significant trade-off between reducing the risk of water quality violations by limiting the duration of permits and decreasing the overall cost efficiency, since dischargers must plan their individual waste management practices under additional uncertainty. It is, of course, possible that this tradeoff would not exist in another river basin; the solution to a BOD market simulation could violate the water quality standard significantly.
In practice, any set of plausible scenarios about the future could be evaluated by using stochastic simulation; some of them could be based on projections made by a planning agency, and some could be based on extreme sets of conditions. More complex assumptions can also be made: for instance, the probabilities of locating packets in sections can be modified as the simulation progresses. (As an example, the value of pi could be increased if one or more packets are already assigned to section i; this modification would simulate economies of scale with respect to factors, such as transportation, that affect location decisions.) In this study, four additional scenarios were constructed for the Delaware example. A mid-future scenario (2) was based on the assumption that existing waste load patterns would continue, e.g., growth in waste production activities would occur either by existing dischargers or by others in nearby locations, such as within major metropolitan areas. For each section of the estuary the total current waste discharge level (prior to a new management program) was placed in one of the categories listed in Table 3 , and the corresponding weighting factor was applied in calculating the probability of locating each packet of BOD in that section. (The formula given for pi was modified by multiplying each L, by the weighting factor w.)
The results of 100 simulation runs are summarized in Table  4 . Under scenario 2, the minimum DO levels are higher than those in the first stochastic simulation (with equal weighting factors) and closer to those resulting from the BOD market simulation. This result is explained by the fact that fewer BOD packets are located in sections that do not contain existing dischargers under scenario 2 than in the equal-weights case. In the BOD market simulation, of course, all packets are located where there are existing dischargers. In the case of the 2 mg/l standard the DO level (1.9 mg/l) for the BOD market solution is nearly the same as the average value of the stochastic simulation results from scenario A, but in the case of the 3 mg/l standard it is considerably higher than the D O value in all 100 of the stochastic simulation runs. In fact, none of the 100 runs produces a solution that meets the DO standard in the case of the 3.0 or 3.6 mg/l standard; this result highlights the fact that water quality violations could occur under a TDP program for the Delaware, even though a steady state market simulation shows no such problems.
Scenario 3 was constructed to examine an opposite trend in regional development. The weighting factors given in Table 3 were selected to reflect the assumption that growth would tend to occur where waste production activities are not currently located. In this case the expected D O levels are much below those obtained under scenario 2 and are also below those obtained under scenario 1. This observation suggests that the risk of water quality problems may be reduced by applying market restrictions that prevent or limit sales of permits that would be exercised in areas where there are currently no major waste discharges.
Two other scenarios, 4 and 5, that are more extreme also illustrate this point. In scenario 4 it was assumed that the permits would be distributed only in sections where dischargers are currently located, and a very large (10,000) weighting factor was applied to each of these sections. In scenario 5 it was assumed that permits would only be distributed in sections where there are no current major dischargers, and a large weighting factor (10,000) was applied to these sections. Table 4 shows the much lower DO levels that would be expected if permits are exercised in new sections (scenario 5 ) than would be expected if future dischargers remain in the same sections as existing dischargers (scenario 4).
In summary, over a wide range of scenarios, the lowest points on the DO profiles over all simulation runs are con- siderably higher than the worst case D O values, suggesting that the worst case conditions are highly unlikely. The equal weights scenario was also evaluated, using 500 simulation runs, and very nearly identical results obtained; these results strengthen the observation that the worst case DO values are highly unlikely. On the other hand, in all scenarios the simulated results indicate that violations of each DO standard would be very likely; furthermore, the minimum DO levels are likely to be lower than the values for the BOD market solutions. Those observations are very robust in the case of the 3.0 and 3.6 mg/l DO standards in the sense that over all scenarios every simulated solution violates the DO standard and produces a lower minimum DO level than the BOD market solution.
POTENTIAL WATER QUALITY IMPACTS OF T D P PROGRAMS
BASED ON PERMITS FOR DISSOLVED OXYGEN DEFICIT CONTRIBUTION As discussed by Eheart [1980] , discharge permits may be defined in terms of an allowable impact on the dissolved oxygen (DO) at a critical water quality checkpoint under specified critical flow conditions. A permit defines the allowed D O deficit contribution (DODC), and the corresponding allowable BOD discharge at a given location must be evaluated by using a water quality model. If DODC permits are exchanged, the BOD discharge may increase or decrease. The D O level at the specified location, however, remains unchanged. Furthermore, a DODC program would tend to produce a least cost solution for meeting a standard if the critical point can be determined a priori. If the critical point changes with varying waste load conditions, however, then a DODC program could not be defined in a way that ensures the maintenance of the water quality standard.
Worst case analyses were carried out for the Willamette and Delaware examples. Details of the procedure are given by Brill et al. [1981) . In the Willamette case the mouth of the river was used to define the DODC permits. This point was observed to be the critical point, regardless of how DODC permits are exchanged. Thus the DODC program would ensure that there would be no violation of the standard as a result of a permit market (see Table 5 ).
As shown in Table 5 for the Delaware example, however, it is possible to have a location pattern for DODC permits that causes severe DO depletion at points other than the checkpoint used to define the permits (section 18 of estuary). Discharge at some locations produces a very small impact at that checkpoint under current loading conditions. Thus, under a strict DODC program, if permits are transferred to those locations, the allowable BOD discharges would be very large-in fact, large enough to deplete the DO completely many times over at new critical points on the DO profile. This result highlights the limitation stated above for the DODC program, Le., it is impractical in cases where the critical water quality point does not remain stable over a wide range of waste-loading conditions. One variation of the program that would partially reduce this problem would be to specify a maximum BOD load associated with a given permit so that exchanges to certain locations could not greatly increase the allowable BOD load.
RESTRICTIONS ON T D P MARKETS TO REDUCE THE SEVERITY OF POTENTIAL WATER QUALITY IMPACTS
Several types of restrictions can be placed on TDP markets to eliminate or to reduce the potential violations of a given DO standard. Limits on trade can be imposed by requiring approval of every sale or by designating certain regions where approval is required before a permit can be exercised. Alternatively, exchange of permits can be limited to dischargers within specified geographical zones. Finally, permits can be revalued automatically if they are exchanged. This chapter examines these approaches and combinations of them and illustrates a framework for analysis. One important general trade-off associated with the application of market restrictions is that, although potential violations of the D O standard are reduced, these restrictions could also reduce the likelihood of having a viable market. There could be additional uncertainties about the future marketability of permits, and there could be increased transaction and administrative costs. The potential for cost savings through trading is shown below, however, to remain significant for the illustrative cases, even under restrictions. This potential would tend to support a viable market, but the other forces could be offsetting [ U.S. General Accounting Ofice, 19823. 
Limits on Trade
One effective way to prevent violations of a DO standard is to distribute permits initially on the basis of a formula (as in a UT program) and then to require that any sale be approved by the regional authority. The initial distribution and any proposed exchange or set of exchanges can be evaluated by using a water quality model to prevent violations. This approach is direct and should be effective. The burden of analysis falls on the authority, but given the availability of a water quality model, the required analysis should be minimal. One such scheme has been presented by @Neil [1980] . Two possible disadvantages of this approach are (1) periodic markets, such as quarterly auctions, organized by the regional authority would be made quite complex, since a solution determined through bidding may not be allowed, and (2) inequities could result if similar dischargers are not treated similarly in the sense that they are not allowed to make similar market transactions (because of location-dependent effects of BOD discharges). Such inequities could arise with respect to transactions among individuals. They could also arise if an attempt is made to modify the result of a market; in cases where the market solution would not meet the water quality standard, some of the exchanges specified by the solution would have to be disallowed.
Other types of limits would place general restrictions on exchanges. These restrictions would tend to be equitable in the sense that they would be determined during the formulation of the management program and that they would be applied uniformly to all dischargers or to specified groups of them. They would also be administratively simple in the sense that they would not require an analysis of each exchange by using a water quality model.
To illustrate this concept, various limits were placed on the BOD and DODC markets for the Delaware example. As shown above, the worst case analyses indicate the potential for drastic impacts on the DO levels in the case of the Delaware.
The general restrictions examined would limit the total amount of BOD discharged in each of the 30 sections of the river. In sections where there are currently no major dischargers, no permits would be allowed to be exercised. In sections where there are major dischargers, the total discharge in the section would be limited. In the first case, A, it was assumed that every existing discharger would provide 35% BOD removal (or the current level if it is higher) and that the remaining total of existing discharges in each section would be the maximum allowable aggregate discharge in that section.
As shown in Table 6 the worst possible D O levels obtained in the original worst case analysis are 0.0, 0.0, and 0.8 mg/l. Case A allows complete flexibility for exchanges among existing dischargers (except for the minimal treatment requirement); the market solution assuming steady state conditions would be identical to the BOD market solution discussed above. Cost comparisons are also provided in Table 6 . For example, the cost of the UT solution for meeting a 3 mg/l D O standard would be $14.8 million, while the BOD market solution would cost $8.4 million. The cost of the LC program would be $4.9 million. In general the market solution with some limits on trade would improve cost efficiency considerably in comparison to the UT program. Violations of the D O standard could still occur, but they could not be nearly as severe as those obtained in the original worst case analysis.
More restrictive limits on trade could be expected to decrease the cost efficiency of the BOD market program but should reduce the risk of severe water quality impacts because of permit transfers. This trade-off is shown by cases B through D in Table 6 . These cases assume that the maximum aggregate discharge in any section is limited to smaller and smaller amounts. In case B, for example, the 50% label indicates that if all dischargers in a given section remove 50% of the BOD wastes, then the total waste load remaining would be the maximum allowable aggregate discharge in that section.
Consider, for example, the 3 mg/l standard, which would be met by a UT program costing $14.8 million. The worst case analysis indicates that the DO could be completely depleted.
Case A would allow significant cost savings, but water quality violations could still occur. Cases B and C would increase the worst possible DO level to 2.2 and 2.7 mg/l, respectively. By simulating the effect of these restrictions on the BOD market for existing dischargers under steady state conditions, the cost was estimated to increase from $8.4 million in case A to $10.0 and $12.5 million in cases B and C. These solutions show that any additional flexibility in comparison to the rigid UT program allows some improvement in cost etliciency. Also, the worst possible DO levels are considerably better than the levels obtained in the worst case analysis. (Also, the actual occurrence of the worst possible DO level under any of the limits on trade is unlikely; stochastic simulation could be used to explore more thoroughly any specific case in practice, as illustrated).
The DODC program was also examined with the aggregate discharge restrictions for each section specified in case A. As shown in Table 6 the worst possible values under this program are much closer to the DO standard than are the worst case values. This result is obtained because the limits on trade prevent transfers of permits to sections where the allowable BOD load increases greatly, causing severe water quality impacts at points other than the original critical point (see discussion above). These limits are also designed to allow complete flexibility for exchanges among existing dischargers at current waste production levels.
In general, some improvements in cost efficiency result from market programs (in BOD or DODC markets) in comparison to the UT program, even if restrictions are placed on trade. As shown in the BOD market examples there is a trade-off between the degree of the market restrictions and the improvement in the worst possible DO values. Of course, future improvements in cost efficiency as dischargers expand or as new ones appear would be limited by the trade restrictions. Such restrictions appear to be justified on two grounds: (1) If newcomers locate in regions where their discharges cause water quality problems in new portions of a waterway, then it is appropriate to restrict their purchase of discharge permits on economic efficiency grounds, since new water quality problems would cause new societal damages. Market restrictions do not necessarily prohibit growth in such regions, however, since the regional authority could either approve permit sales to newcomers or to expanding dischargers or even grant them new permits. In either case the authority should examine potential water quality impacts associated with individual requests. (2) It is appropriate on equity grounds to distinguish between existing dischargers and newcomers (including existing dischargers experiencing rapid expansion), New and different water quality problems would result from new levels of waste production and would justify the requirement for individual approvals and different treatment of different potential dischargers by the authority.
Zone Markets
Permits can be defined so that they can be exercised in only a certain region, or zone, along a watercourse. The first use of zones, in the case of the Delaware River, was primarily designed to improve cost efficiency; specifically, the zoned uniform treatment program was examined as an alternative to the UT program [Thomann, 1972, p. 2651. The same water quality standards could be met by allowing larger aggregate discharges than those allowed under the UT program in regions where water quality impacts were low. The use of zones was also considered in a study of the Upper Mohawk Basin [Kshirsager and Eheart, 19823 . In general, zones may represent any subsets of dischargers and could, for example, be defined on the basis of type of discharge or type of industry.
In contrast to the use of zones for increasing allowable aggregate BOD discharges, this paper considers the use of by restricting the area over which a permit may be exchanged. Such areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous geographical regions.
Two-zoned cases were evaluated for the Delaware example; the three-zone and four-zone were defined according to the groupings identified by the original Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Study (DECS) [Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, 19661, and are described in Table 7 . (The second zone in the three-zone case was divided into two zones to form the second and third zones in the four-zone case.) Dischargers in each zone were assumed to participate in a market for BOD discharge permits for their zone only; the total BOD load in each zone was specified to be the same as the aggregate allocation to the dischargers in that zone under the UT program. By contrast, in the DECS study the allocations to the various zones were selected to minimize cost while maintaining DO standards. (Any set of zone allocations can be evaluated by using the framework presented here.)
The BOD markets in all zones were simulated by assuming steady state conditions for the dischargers. The aggregate costs of the solutions obtained are shown in Table 8 . The cost increases as more zones are defined, since more restrictions are placed on exchanges. For the 3 mg/l D O standard the cost obtained from the simulation of the basin-wide BOD market is $8.4 million; the cost increases to $9.8 and $10.1 million in the three-zone and four-zone cases, respectively. The worst possible DO level, evaluated by using the water quality model, remains at 0.0 mg/l in the three-zone case and improves to 0.7 mg/l in the four-zone case. As mentioned above, the potential loads of the basin-wide BOD market case are very much larger than those required to drive the D O level to zero under certain geographical loading patterns. In the three-zone case this situation is ameliorated somewhat, indicating that the trend is for adverse water quality impacts to be reduced as additional zones are defined. For the examples examined, however, zones alone would not prevent permit exchanges that would cause violations of the D O standard.
Limits on aggregate discharge in any section of the watercourse can also be imposed when a zone-market program is used. For example, the least restrictive limits on discharge in each section correspond to case A described above. (A11 existing dischargers in each of the 30 sections are assumed to provide at least 35% BOD removal; the remaining aggregate discharge load provides the upper limit for future discharge in that section.) As shown by the numbers in parentheses in Table 8 the worst possible DO level, with limits on aggregate discharge in each section, improves as more zones are defined. For example, under the 3 mg/l DO standard the worst possible value for the basin-wide market is 1.7 mg/l; the value improves to 2.1 and 2.7 mg/i for the three-zone and four-zone cases, respectively. The worst possible D O level is within 0.3 mg/l of the original standard in the four-zone case. There is a trade-off with cost efficiency, however, as indicated by the cost of the market solution ($10.1 million in the four-zone case versus $8.4 million for the basin-wide market solution). Of course, the limits could be waived on a case-by-case basis, as discussed above.
Thus zone solutions may decrease the worst possible DO impact. Furthermore, if limits on discharge in any section are also imposed, the worst possible DO levels are reasonably close to the DO standard that would be met by the corresponding UT program. The flexibility of a market system, however, does allow improvements in cost efficiency in comparison to the UT program, even if exchanges are limited by zones and upper limits on discharge in specific areas.
Uniform Revaluation Factors
A third mechanism examined for limiting drastic DO impacts is the application of a uniform revaluation factor (RF) to any permit that is exchanged. The DODC program may be viewed as revaluing (BOD load) permits that are exchanged individually on the basis of the location of discharge before and after the exchange. The RF programs examined in this section specify that any permit (or portion thereof) issued at the beginning of the program is revalued downward by a uniform RF if it is transferred, regardless of whether the transfer improves or worsens water quality. For example, if RF = 0.75 and if discharger A is initially granted a permit to discharge lo00 kg/d of BOD, then the permit would be devalued to 750 kg/d if A sells the permit to discharger B. The application of the RF tends to reduce adverse water quality impacts that may result from changing the location of a given waste load. Of course, some market exchanges could have a beneficial impact on water quality, even without the application of an RF; if such exchanges are inhibited because of the RF, then the improvement would not take place. Because of the RF, fewer exchanges would take place than would if using a BOD permit market without revaluation, and the total program cost would be greater. Some exchanges would be made, however, and this flexibility would allow some improvements in cost efficiency in comparsion to a-UT program.
BOD permit markets with various revaluation factors were examined for the Delaware and Willamette examples. The original BOD markets discussed above can be viewed as special cases where RF = 1. In evaluating other revaluation factors the BOD permits were assumed to be distributed initally as under a UT program. The R F was applied to determine the set of exchanges that would result from a single-price auction.
The method of analysis was similar to that used to analyze the original BOD market program. Details of the procedure are given by Brill et al. [1981] .
Since only one round of exchanges was considered, the results correspond to a program that requires the application of the revaluation factor upon the first transfer of any permit initially distributed. The RF would not apply to the second transfer of a given permit. Under these conditions, the same solutions could be obtained in an informal market with individual exchanges in place of the single-price auction if all dischargers are aware of all possible trading options. An option, of course, would be to apply the RF to all transfers; the total waste load would decrease over time, and the value of discharge permits would increase. This process could continue too far, however, leading to too few permits when overall program benefits and costs are considered.
Delaware River Analysis
The BOD market was evaluated by using revaluation factors of 0.75 and 0.35 for initial BOD allocations corresponding to the UT solutions described above. Market solutions were evaluated for the existing dischargers under steady state conditions, and the aggregate economic cost was calculated. The DO profile was determined for each market solution, and the worst case DO impact was calculated. The results are summarized for three initial waste load allocations in Table 9 . The effect of an RF value less than 1 is to decrease the number of exchanges as well as to decrease the total BOD discharge. As a result, as shown in Table 9 , the aggregate cost increases as R F decreases. Also, the critical value of the D O profile may change because the market solution changes. As shown in the case of the 2 mg/l DO standard, the minimum DO increases (from 1.9 to 2.7 mg/l) in changing from the original BOD market solution to the one with RF = 0.75. The minimum DO actually decreases slightly with R F = 0.35 instead of 0.75. One reason for such results is that fewer permits are traded because of the relatively extreme devaluation. (On the other hand, every market solution produces a different location pattern, and therefore different DO profiles are produced.) In all cases shown, market solutions with R F = 0.75 or 0.35 produce a higher minimum value of DO than does the UT solution. Furthermore, in the case of the 3.0 or 3.6 mg/l standard, R F values of 0.35 and 0.75 produce minimum DO values that are nearly the same as the minimum values in the original BOD market solution.
The worst case DO values, however, are consistently better when the RF factors are applied than in the original BOD market case. For instance, in the case of the 3.6 mg/l DO standard, the worst case values of DO are 0.8, 1.6, and 2.8 for the original BOD market, an RF value of 0.75, and an RF value of 0.35, respectively. Furthermore, if limits on trade are also imposed (see case A in the subsection on limits on trade), the worst case values begin to approach the D O standard. In the case of the 3.6 mg/l DO standard the worst case value changes from 2.8 mg/l under the original BOD market to 3.3 mg/l when RF = 0.35. Thus the combination of limits on trade and revaluation factors may be effective in controlling the worst possible DO impacts. As shown in Table 9 the cost of such a program would be $18.8 million compared to $15.9 million and $25.1 million for the original BOD market and UT solutions, respectively. Thus, there is a trade-off between *Numbers in parentheses provide the worst case DO levels if limits are placed on discharge in any section cost eficiency and the maximum degree to which the DO standard could be violated. Revaluation factors can also be used in zoned programs with or without limits. Example comparisons are provided in Table 10 for the worst possible DO values for the Delaware example. The typical worst case values improve considerably with the application of an RF factor. For example, in the case of the 3 mg/l D O standard and four zones, the worst possible D O value increases from 0.7 mg/l for four BOD markets to 2.7 mg/l for four BOD markets with RF = 0.35. The effect is comparable to adding limits on trade to the BOD market. For instance, in the example just mentioned the worst case value increases from 0.7 to 2.7 mg/l if limits are placed on trade, and it also increases to 2.7 mg/l if an RF value of 0.35 is imposed. If both restrictions are applied, the worst case value improves only slightly more (to 2.9 mg/l). In the case of four zones with RF = 0.35 and with limits on trade the worst possible DO value is within 0.1 mg/l of the DO standard.
Willamette River Analysis
Similar analyses were carried out for the Willamette River example; basin-wide BOD markets were examined by using RF values of 0.5 and 0.35. The major results are summarized in Table 11 . The BOD market solutions have approximately the same costs as the corresponding least cost solutions. The costs of the market solutions increase only slightly as the RF value decreases. For example, the largest percentage increase occurs under the 7.5 mg/l standard (a 13% increase from $3.8 million for the BOD market solution to $4.3 million for the BOD market solution with RF = 0.35). In each case the minimum point on the D O profile improves as the value of RF decreases from unity to 0.35, and it meets or exceeds the standard.
The worst case DO levels under a BOD market program in the Willamette are not nearly as serious as those in the Delaware example. Nevertheless, in each case it is possible to have violations of the DO standard; for instance, the D O level could be as low as 3.6 mg/l in the case of the 4.8 mg/l standard. By applying an RF value of 0.35, the worst possible value increases to 4.8 (the value of the standard). Similarly, an R F value of 0.5 can be applied to ensure that the D O standards of 6.0 and 7.5 mg/l are not violated.
In the case of all three standards the flexibility allowed by the market programs, in comparison to the UT programs, does lead to improvements in cost efficiency. The costs of the market solutions are the same ($2.9 million) in the case of the 4.8 mg/l standard for the original BOD market and for R F values of 0.5 and 0.35. The UT cost is $3.2 million. In the 6.0 and 7.5 mg/l cases an RF value of 0.5 ensures that the standard is met, and, the cost of the market solution is approximately midway between the cost of the original BOD market solution and the cost of the UT solution. Thus in these cases there is a trade-off between the decrease in the maximum possible violation and cost efficiency. (Although all programs appear to cost nearly the same, the market programs may allow future improvements in Cost efficiency as existing discharges expand their activities or as new ones locate on the river.)
CONCLUSIONS
A market program with no restrictions on trading may have the potential for severe adverse water quality impacts because Methods for analyzing the worst case conditions have been described. Such conditions are not necessarily likely to occur, however. In all market programs examined, for example, there is only one case (Delaware River with 2 mg/l D O standard) where there would be a violation of the D O standard for the estimated market solution for existing dischargers at existing waste production levels. Usually the DO level at the lowest point in the profile improves in comparison to the standard as exchanges occur. In the future, however, the location pattern could change in unforseen ways as some dischargers expand waste production levels and as new dischargers locate on the waterway. A stochastic simulation technique is demonstrated for analyzing potential water quality impacts under various sets of assumptions. Such an analysis for the Delaware example indicates that future BOD market solutions could violate the DO standard under widely varying conditions.
If it is shown that water quality conditions may violate the applicable standard under a TDP program, market restrictions can be used to reduce or possibly to eliminate this possibility. Limits on trade that restrict the total discharge within each section of waterway may greatly reduce the worst possible water quality impacts. A trade-off with cost efficiency may occur, however, as shown in the Delaware example. Also, in this example, potential violations of the DO standard could occur, and inequities could arise as some trades would be prevented, although similar trades would be allowed. In general, however, it seems appropriate to restrict the use of permits in new sections of a river if new and serious water quality problems would occur.
Permits can also be defined so that they can be traded only within certain zones or groups of dischargers. The use of zones is also demonstrated to reduce significantly the worst possible DO impacts in the Delaware example. When zones are combined with limits on trade, the worst possible DO values are within 0.5 mg/l of the corresponding DO standard.
Uniform revaluation factors are also shown to be effective in reducing the worst possible DO impacts of a TDP program. In the Willamette case it is possible to ensure that the DO standard would be met by the worst possible DO level. There may, however, be a trade-off with cost efficiency; in two cases the cost would increase to a value midway between the cost of the original BOD market program and the cost of the UT program.
In the Delaware example, revaluation factors could be combined with zones or with limits on trade to ensure that the worst possible DO levels would be within 0.5 mg/l of the D O standard for the three values of the standard examined. If all three types of market restrictions are applied, the worst possible D O level would be within 0.1 mgJl of each standard.
In general, worst case conditions should be examined because it is possible to have severe violations of a water quality standard under a TDP program. Restrictions in the market can be used, however, to control or to eliminate violations. There are, however, trade-offs with cost efficiency and equity. There are, of course, other ways to remedy severe adverse water quality impacts. As an example the regional authority could buy back some of the permits; if permits are initially sold by the authority rather than being given away, some of the funds obtained could be used for this purpose. Similarly, the authority could allow organizations other than dischargers to purchase permits with the intention of not using them. Another possible remedy is that the authority could issue some permits with very short durations; it would then have the option of not renewing them if unexpected water quality violations occur. This approach could decrease cost efficiency, however, since dischargers would face uncertainty about the availability of permits in the near future
